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Abstract: This paper deals with decision problems under uncertainty. The
solution of a decision problem involves observation, processing, and modeling
of statistical data in order to quantify the uncertainty. Better data measure-
ment and estimation of uncertainty add more consistency to the solution of a
decision problem. The paper proposes a new way of predicting the Bayesian-
Nash equilibrium which uses information sources to measure new information
received by information consumers. Thus, the estimation of uncertainty is
based on a more solid mathematical foundation, needed (as in the case of arti-
ﬁcial intelligence) to produce logical inferences. From another perspective, the
externalization of information helps the software designers to produce better
software architectures for decision support systems. An theoretical example
illustrates a market situation with a small number of ﬁrms, each ﬁrm’s output
being likely to have a large impact on the market price.
Keywords: Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, information source, conditional prob-
ability distribution.
1 Introduction
Game theory, founded by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947), studies situations in which
multiple agents or players interact in order to each maximize an objective (payoﬀ) function. The
payoﬀ function of a player is determined not only by its own actions, but also by the actions of
other players. In a game with incomplete information, the payoﬀs also depend on information
that is private to the individual agents. This information is known as an agent’s type.
Bayesian decision theory is concerned with the question of how a player (decision maker)
should choose a particular action from a set of possible choices if the outcome of the choice
also depends on some unknown state (from the states of the world). In our approach, the
decision maker is modeling the information received by the system (i.e. new information) as an
information source ( [2]). A decision problem involves one or several information sources. We
Copyright c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assume that each person is able to represent his beliefs, as the likelihood of the diﬀerent n states
of the information source, by a subjective discrete probability distribution ( [5]).
The structure of this paper is as follows. After this introductory section, the next one intro-
duces the teoretical background related to games with incomplete information and information
sources. The third section presents the Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the presence of information
sources, and the fourth discusses a market-related example. The last section compares the pro-
posed approach with the classical one, and outlines future work.
2 Theoretical background
This section introduces the main concepts discussed in this paper. It starts with some deﬁni-
tions stating the context, and then deﬁnes the concept of information source, both taken from [1]
and [3]. The last sub-section introduces the new concept of Bayesian-Nash equilibrium based on
information sources.
In what follows, information means a message about an event that has occurred, will occur,
or is likely to occur. The received information regarding a possible realization of an event is
extremely important. Information is a particular case of reﬂection, as an interaction between
two processes; one’s properties (the process that generates or produces information) will be
reproduced in another process or several other processes (that consume information). Interaction
between two or more processes involves an exchange of information.
2.1 Games with incomplete information
Deﬁnition 1. A game with incomplete information ( [1]), is denoted by:
 t = (I; (Fi)i2I ; (pit(f; ))i2I ; (i)i2I ; t); (1)
where:
 I is the set of players, jIj = m,
 Fi is the strategy set for player i; i = 1;m, and F = F1F2    Fm is the the set of all
possible strategy proﬁles;
 f = (f1; f2;    ; fm) 2 F is a joint strategy or strategy proﬁle;
 i is the set of types for the player i, and  = 12    m is the joint type space;
  = (1; 2;    ; m) 2  is the joint type of all players;
 pit(f; ) is the payoﬀ function for player i at the moment t if the strategy f and the type
combination  are chosen. Note that the payoﬀ for the player i may depend not only on
its type i, but also on the other players’ type, denoted by  i.
 t - the probability distribution on the set  at the moment t.
In our exposition, we assume that type sets i are ﬁnite; consequently,  is a ﬁnite set
also. t();  2  denotes the probability of chosing type combination  at the moment t. As
in [4], we assume, without loss of generality, that players have incomplete information about
their opponents’ payoﬀs but have complete information about the strategies of all other players.
The following deﬁnition, taken from [1,3], introduces the classical Bayes-Nash equilibrium of
a game with incomplete information.
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Deﬁnition 2. A strategy proﬁle f() = (f1(1); f2(2);    ; fm(m)) constitutes a Bayes-Nash












 i( i); i;  i)  t( iji) (2)
holds for all possible players i 2 I and all types i 2 i and all strategies fi 2 Fi.
2.2 Information sources
A process (information producer or consumer) is speciﬁed by a set of n variables, denoted by
V = fV1; V2;    ; Vng, where Vj is the set of values for the jth variable: Vj = fv1j ; v2j ;    ; vnjj g.
The state of a process at a certain moment is given by the vector v = fv1; v2;    ; vng; vj 2
Vj ; j = 1; n. Future values of all variables are random, and the realization of the states depends
on received information. This information is in message form, decreasing or increasing the
uncertainty of the realization of an event.
An information source is a way of specifying the states of a process, regarding one or several
variables. The information source assigned to the jth variable is denoted by Sj , and the set
of distinct values vkj 2 Vj ; k = 1; nj , represents a complete space of events. The simultaneous
realization of two events is impossible, and the union of the events represents a certain event. A
state skj of the information source S
j is assigned to each event vj = vkj . For a bounded interval
of time, only information sources with a ﬁnite number of states will be taken into account.
Consider the following assumptions:
 each player is able to represent his beliefs, as to the likelihood of the diﬀerent nj states of
the information source Sj , by a subjective discrete probability distribution.
 the information source Sj has discrete states and the individual is supposed to be able to
assign to each state skj a degree of belief, in the form of (normalized) numerical weights p
k
j ,
between zero and one and whose sum is one:




(pkj is the probability that the state s
k
j occurs).
If the information source Sj has nj states, the set of states and probabilities deﬁned at a







; j = 1; n.
A simple information source is an information source deﬁned with respect to a single variable
Vj . A complex information source is an information source deﬁned with respect to two or more
variables, which can be independent or dependent. In the second case (i.e. the variables are
related to one another), the mathematical model of the complex information source needs to
contain this dependency.
In order to illustrate how a complex information source is constructed, let’s consider for the
beginning the simplest case of two independent variables, V1 2 V and V2 2 V and assign to each














where sk1; k = 1; n1 are the states of information source S1t and sl2; l = 1; n2 are the states of
information source S2t .
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The complex information source SC1;2t , built with respect to the variables V1 and V2 at the












Now let us consider the case of two dependent variables, with the simple information source
S1t assigned to the independent variable V1, and the simple information source S2t assigned to








For a state of the source S1t , denoted by sk1, the information source S2t conditioned by the
















2jS1t = sl1) is the probability of occurence of state sl2 conditioned by
state sk1.













where the probability of occurence of the state sk1sl2 is:










1)  P (S2t = sl2jS1t = sk1) = pk1(t)  pk;l2 (t).
If S2t is a discrete probability distribution and S1t is an information source, then, according
to the above discussion, we can say that S2t is a distribution conditioned by information source
S1t . Therefore we have a probability distribution updated by an information source.
3 Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the presence of information sources
Let us consider now the probability distribution t deﬁned on the discrete set  and a
information source St (simple or complex), common to all players. According to the probability
distribution conditioned by an information source discussed above, we have:
P (t = ;St = s
j) = P (St = s
j)  P (t = jSt = sj), where  2  and sj 2 St.
3.1 Notations
Considering the following notations:
 P (t; St) - the joint probability of t and St occurring simultaneously, referred to as the
historic probability distribution,
 P (t=St) - the probability of t occurrring conditional on St having occurred (i.e. the con-
ditional probability of t given St), also known as the probability distribution of information
source, and
 P (St) - the marginal probability of St, referred to as the posterior probability distribution,




According to the above, posterior means historical updated with information, i.e. the proba-
bility distribution t conditioned by the information source St, denoted by ct, is the probability
distribution t updated by the information source St.
332 I. Parpucea, B. Pârv, T. Socaciu
The information source St is a possible probability distribution of states at the moment t+1.
Denoting the game with incomplete information at the moment t+1 and based on St with  t+1,
it can be deﬁned recursively as follows:
 t+1 =  t(St), where  t+1 = (I; (Fi)i2I ; (pit(f; ))i2I ; (i)i2I ; ct).
The game  t+1 is the updated game  t based upon St. This information source updates
probability distribution t on  and thus the equilibrium of  t is modiﬁed.
3.2 Decision functions and strategies
If a player receives information about his/her own type, then he/she can choose a particular
strategy to maximize his/her expected payoﬀ.
Deﬁnition 3. A decision function of player i 2 I, denoted by fi(:), is a function that, for
each type i 2 i, speciﬁes the strategy fi(i) 2 Fi this player will choose if his/her type turns
out to be i.
Let cjt ( ij(i)) be the updated probability obtained by using Bayesian updating rule, of a
particular type combination for the opponents  i, given that player i has type i. For each type
proﬁle  2 , there are updated beliefs for each player, i.e. a list of conditional probability dis-
tributions
 
c1t ( 1j1);    ; cmt ( mjm)

. Players’ beliefs after they have received information
about their types, are no longer identical.
Deﬁnition 4. The strategy combination of all players except player i, that will be played
according to the decision functions f i(:), if type combination  i occurs, is a list of decision
functions f i(:) = (f1(:);    ; fi 1(:); fi+1(:);    ; fI(:)) for all players (other than player i) and
 i(:) = (1;    ; i 1; i+1;    ; I), a type combination for the other players, f i( i), that is:
f i(i) = (f1(1);    ; fi 1(i 1); fi+1(i+1);    ; fm(m)).
3.3 Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the presence of information sources
The above deﬁnitions allow us to give the following:
Deﬁnition 5. The Bayes - Nash equilibrium of the game  t+1 is a list of decision functions















holds for all strategies fi 2 Ft.
The equilibrium of  t+1 can diﬀer from the equilibrium of  t due to the information in St.





where fij(:) is the equilibrium of player i for the state s
j of the information source St and
pj(t) is the probability that St = sj . The above equation represents the updated equilibrium as
a weighted average of all equilibria for the states of information source.
4 A market-related example
Consider a game with incomplete information, where the players are two ﬁrms supplying
slightly diﬀerent products (produced with zero production costs, as in [1]), with prices denoted
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by p1 and p2. As a result of new received information, the variation of each price around the
average price can be modeled using two simple information sources, S1t and S2t , as it follows:
S1t :






s12 : p2  p2 s22 : p2 > p2
2 1  2

where p1 represents the average price of the ﬁrst ﬁrm, and p2 the average price of the second
ﬁrm. Both information sources have two states, (s11; s21) and (s12; s22), with the probabilities
(1; 1  1) and (2; 1  2), respectively.
4.1 Notations
For our example, consider the following problem-speciﬁc notations:
 The demand functions for the goods of the two ﬁrms:
d1(p1; p2) = a p1 + b p2; d2(p1; p2) = c p1 + d p2,
where pi = pi   pi; i = 1; 2, are the deviation of price pi from the average price pi. Firm
one does not know parameters c and d; ﬁrm two does not know parameters a and b.
 The sets of possible types of the two players:
1 = f(ai; bj); i = 1; 2; j = 1; 2g ;2 = f(ci; dj); i = 1; 2; j = 1; 2g;
 The payoﬀ functions of the two players:
1 (p1; p2; (ai; bj)) = (ai p1 + bj p2)  p1;
2 (p1; p2; (ci; dj)) = (ci p1 + dj p2)  p2:
4.2 Building the complex information source
With the above notations, the complex information source is rewritten as:
SCt+1 :

p1  p1 ^ p2  p2 p1  p1 ^ p2 > p2 p1 > p1 ^ p2  p2 p1 > p1 ^ p2 > p2
1  2 1  (1  2) (1  1)  2 (1  1)  (1  2)

,
no matter what dependency relation is between the two prices considered. The information
source SCt+1 describes the behavior of the market of the both products considering the variation
of their prices in the next period, as a result of the received information.
In a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, each ﬁrm is supposed to choose a type contingent strategy,
that is decision functions p1(:) and p2(:) respectively, which is the best response to the oppo-
nent’s decision function. In this example, ct is a probability distribution deﬁned on 1  2
and conditioned by the information source SCt. For a state sk1sl2 of source SCt we build two
conditional distributions, c1t and c2t as can be seen next.
4.3 Computing the best response for the ﬁrm one
Consider p2(:) = (p2(c1; d1); p2(c1; d2); p2(c2; d1); p2(c2; d2)) as given (ﬁxed) and suppose that
ﬁrm one has just learned that it has the demand parameters (a1; b1). Firm one’s expected payoﬀ
can be rewritten as:
1 (p1(a1; b1); p2(c1; d1))  c1t ((c1; d1)j(a1; b1)) +
+1 (p1(a1; b2); p2(c1; d2))  c1t ((c1; d2)j(a1; b1)) +
+1 (p1(a2; b1); p2(c2; d1))  c1t ((c2; d1)j(a1; b1)) +
+1 (p1(a2; b2); p2(c2; d2))  c1t ((c2; d2)j(a1; b1)) =
= a1  p21(a1; b1) + p1(a1; b1) (b1  p2(cidj ja1b1)  a1p1   b1p2) : (4)
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In the above equation we used the following notation for the average price p2 conditioned by
state (a1; b1):
p2(ci; dj)ja1b1) = p2(c1; d1)  c1t ((c1; d1)j(a1; b1)) + p2(c1; d2)  c1t ((c1; d2)j(a1; b1)) +
+p2(c2; d1)  c1t ((c2; d1)j(a1; b1)) + p2(c2; d2)  c1t ((c2; d2)j(a1; b1)):
The payoﬀ function (4) is continuously diﬀerentiable in ﬁrm one’s strategy p1(:). Therefore,
any p1 satisfying the ﬁrst - order condition for a maximum will be the best response to the
type-contingent strategy p2(:), previously considered. Solving the ﬁrst - order condition for the
maximum of the expected payoﬀ function (4), one obtains the following best response p1(a1; b1)








(p2   p2(cidj ja1b1))): (5)





















(p2   p2(cidj ja2b2)): (8)
4.4 Computing the best response for the ﬁrm two
Now consider that ﬁrm two learns that its type is (c1; d1). For a ﬁxed type-contingent strategy
of ﬁrm one p1(:) = (p1(a1; b1); p1(a1; b2); p1(a2; b1); p1(a2; b2)), the expected payoﬀ of ﬁrm two
will be as follows:
2 (p1(a1; b1); p2(c1; d1))  c2t ((a1; b1)j(c1; d1)) +
+2 (p1(a1; b2); p2(c1; d2))  c2t ((a1; b2)j(c1; d1)) +
+2 (p1(a2; b1); p2(c2; d1))  c2t ((a2; b1)j(c1; d1)) +
+2 (p1(a2; b2); p2(c2; d2))  c2t ((a2; b2)j(c1; d1)) =
= d1  p22(c1; d1) + p2(c1; d1) (c1  p1(aibj jc1d1)  c1p1   d1p2) : (9)
In the equation (9) of the payoﬀ function for the second ﬁrm, the average price p1 conditioned
by the state (c1; d1), is given by:
p1(ai; bj)jc1d1) = p1(a1; b1)  c2t ((a1; b1)j(c1; d1)) + p1(a1; b2)  c2t ((a1; b2)j(c1; d1)) +
p1(a2; b1)  c2t ((a2; b1)j(c1; d1)) + p1(a2; b2)  c2t ((a2; b2)j(c1; d1)):







(p1   p1(aibj jc1d1))): (10)






















(p1   p1(aibj jc2d2))): (13)
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4.5 Conclusion
In order to ﬁnd a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, one has to solve the system of equations given
by the best response functions. With two players and four types for each player, this leads to a
system of eight equations. The solution, (p1(:); p2(:)), is the Bayesian -Nash equilibrium. The
probability of realization of equilibrium prices (p1(:); p2(:)), as a result of information received,
is equal to the probability of realization of state sk1sl2 of complex source SCt+1.
5 Conclusions and Future Works
5.1 Our approach vs other approaches
The main points of our approach are as follows:
 The complexity of uncertainty is given by the great (huge) number of variables; when the
complexity of a decision problem (and the number of components dominated by uncer-
tainty) grows, it is recommended to use a Bayesian network ( [6]); in our case, we use a
simple Bayesian network, subject to a learning algorithm;
 The original idea is to separate the set of problem components into two disjoint subsets: (a)
deterministic components, and (b) components dominated by uncertainty; the separation
of game information into external and internal can be done for each decision problem
dominated by uncertainty;
 This separation allows you to study the inﬂuence of each individual factor to the solution
of the game in a more eﬃcient way; also, it suggests some architectural patterns (styles)
to be used when designing a decision support system. The paper [8] discusses this issue in
more detail.
The essential diﬀerence between the classic approach and those proposed in this paper is given
by the separation of the information external to the game from the game-speciﬁc information.
This separation follows the separation of responsibilities principle. This way, both external and
internal elements of the game are easier to model and understand.
The classical approach does not make any diﬀerence between these two categories of infor-
mation; more precisely, the inﬂuence of external information on the uncertainty that dominates
the game is not taken into account/quantiﬁed. By splitting the game information into external
and internal, the former being modeled by information sources, the inﬂuence of external environ-
ment on the variation of the solution is better captured and quantiﬁed. This provides a better
evaluation of the contribution of individual factors to the predicted equilibrium.
Another advantage of this separation is that it allows a better, easier calibration of the model,
by comparing the computed equilibrium with real solution, taken from historical data.
5.2 Future work
Our future eﬀorts are directed to apply this general algorithm to various games with incom-
plete information and to build decision support systems based on it.
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